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An Economic Analysis 
of Liquidity-Saving 
Mechanisms
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
arge-value payments systems, used by banks to settle
  financial and commercial transactions, play a key role 
in the financial system. The importance of these payments 
systems can be illustrated by the large amounts they settle. 
Every year in the United States, the systems process value equal 
to approximately 100 times GDP. 
Innovations in the design of large-value payments systems 
have led to many improvements in their operations. For 
example, over the last twenty years, many countries have 
adopted real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems for their 
large-value payments. In an RTGS system, each payment is 
settled individually, on a gross basis, at the time the payment is 
sent. RTGS systems offer many advantages—for instance, they 
limit the risk exposure of payments system participants and 
allow for rapid final settlement of payments during the day. 
However, RTGS systems require large amounts of central bank 
balances to function smoothly. 
More recent innovations have occurred in the design and 
implementation of various liquidity-saving mechanisms 
(LSMs) that are used in conjunction with RTGS systems.1 
An LSM gives participants in the payments system an 
additional option not offered by RTGS alone: A payment can 
be put into a queue and then released from the queue if some 
prespecified event occurs. Such mechanisms can reduce the 
amount of central bank balances necessary to operate the 
system smoothly as well as quicken the settlement of payments. 
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• Liquidity-saving mechanisms (LSMs) are 
queuing arrangements for payments that 
operate alongside traditional real-time 
gross settlement (RTGS) systems. 
￿ LSMs allow banks to condition the release of 
queued payments on the receipt of offsetting 
or partially offsetting payments; as a result, 
banks are less inclined to delay the sending 
of payments.
￿ An analysis of LSMs finds that these 
mechanisms typically perform better than 
pure RTGS systems when it comes to 
settling payments early.
￿ RTGS systems can sometimes be preferable 
to LSMs, such as when many banks that 
send payments early in RTGS choose to 
queue their payments when an LSM 
is available.
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As we describe in detail below, an LSM allows banks to send 
payments conditional on the receipt of payments, and it can 
accommodate some netting of payments. 
Over the past decade, researchers have been able to simulate 
the performance of various LSMs. In most of these simulations, 
the researcher makes assumptions about the behavior of the 
parties in the system and measures various consequences of the 
assumed behavior. This approach has great potential to yield 
useful answers to a number of questions. 
This article outlines a different approach to the study of 
LSMs in a payments system. It examines a theoretical model 
of the behavior of parties, which for simplicity we refer to as 
banks. Each bank has particular motivations and constraints; 
as a result, its behavior can be determined as an equilibrium 
outcome in response to the incentives it faces. The theoretical 
approach has the advantage of allowing banks’ reactions to 
alternative payments system designs to be determined within 
a theoretical model, rather than be assumed by the researcher. 
This approach also allows outcomes to be compared 
consistently across a number of designs.
Innovations in LSMs are numerous and, in some cases, 
quite complex. A 2005 report by the Bank for International 
Settlements, “New Developments in Large-Value Payment 
Systems,” is an authoritative source on the many alternative 
systems introduced until that time. The research presented 
here generalizes the various types of LSMs by placing their 
essential characteristics into one of two categories: balance 
reactive or receipt reactive. 
A simplified description of an LSM’s operation is as follows. 
A bank wishes to make a payment and has a choice of when 
to submit it to the payments system. Upon submitting the 
payment, the bank has a second choice to make: It can either 
submit the payment to a central queue (the LSM part of the 
payments system, which will be called the LSM channel), 
or attempt to settle the payment at the time of submission 
(the RTGS part of the payments system, which will be called 
1 In this article, liquidity-saving mechanism refers to a mechanism intended to 
economize on the use of central bank reserves. These reserves can typically be 
obtained intraday from the central bank either against collateral or for a small 
fee. A liquidity-saving mechanism can allow payments to be settled with fewer 
central bank reserves. As we discuss, under some circumstances, an LSM can 
indeed economize on the use of central bank balances as well as lead banks to 
submit payments earlier to the payments system. In general, this outcome can 
be defined as making the payments system more “liquid.”
the RTGS channel). If the bank submits the payment to the LSM 
channel, that payment will settle only when certain conditions 
have been met. If the bank attempts to settle via the RTGS 
channel and it has sufficient funds available, the payment 
will settle immediately. 
One condition that might trigger the settlement of a 
payment (and is common to both types of LSMs) occurs when 
the request in the LSM channel is made in the presence of an 
offsetting payment in the queue of the bank to which the 
payment is to be made. If the two payments offset, then both 
can be released by the LSM. 
A condition of another sort is determined by the type of 
LSM used. In a balance-reactive LSM, a bank has the choice of 
reserving some level of its account balances for the settlement 
of payments submitted via the RTGS channel. If the bank’s 
balances exceed the predetermined reserve level, then that 
bank’s payments that were previously placed in the LSM can 
be released. In a receipt-reactive LSM, a queued payment 
can be released against recent receipts of the bank (rather 
than against its accumulated balances) and at any level of 
balances for the bank.
The research reported here reveals two sources of potential 
value to implementing an LSM. First, an LSM gives a bank a 
new tool not available in an RTGS system: It gives the bank 
the option of making a payment conditional on the receipt 
of another payment. In RTGS, banks can find themselves in 
the positions of those two overly polite gentlemen in the old 
vaudeville routine, who repeatedly say to each another: “After 
you, Alphonse.” “No, after you, Gaston.” 2 That is, so long as 
central bank balances are costly, each bank would prefer to 
have its counterparty make a payment first. 
In an RTGS system, there is no way to condition the 
settlement of a payment upon the future receipt of a payment; 
however, this course of action is possible with an LSM. The 
LSM essentially allows the two banks to solve the precedence 
problem that bedevils them in RTGS.3 The ability to condition 
payments on the receipt of offsetting payments provides banks 
with some insurance against the risk of having to borrow funds 
from the central bank (see, for example, Mills and Nesmith 
[2008]). In turn, this means that banks are more willing to 
submit payments to the LSM earlier than they would to the 
RTGS, which usually, but not always, has beneficial effects.
2 The American version of this routine is based on a comic strip by Frederick 
Burr Opper, “Alphonse and Gaston,” which was popular in the early 1900s and 
pokes fun at exaggerated politeness.
3 Note that an internal queue, rather than an LSM, could allow a bank to send 
a payment conditional on receiving another payment. However, investment 
in an internal queue has benefits to other banks that cannot be appropriated 
by the investing bank. In addition, an internal queue does not solve the 
precedence problem; the bank with the internal queue arranges for its 
payments to follow the receipt from other banks. As a result, RTGS systems 
that have internal queues can still suffer from excessive delay in payments.
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The second source of potential value to implementing an 
LSM comes from the offsetting of payments within the queue, 
which reduces the need for central bank balances. The benefit 
arising from payments offsetting in the queue is well 
understood. An important contribution of our research is 
to show that even when no such offsetting occurs, the first 
potential benefit described above means that an LSM can 
improve welfare.
Several authors have examined theoretical behavior in 
RTGS systems. Angelini (1998, 2000) considers the behavior 
of banks in an RTGS system in which they face delayed costs for 
payments as well as costly borrowing of funds. He shows that 
the natural payment timing equilibria of RTGS systems (in the 
absence of LSMs) involve excessive delay of payments, as banks 
do not properly internalize the benefits to other banks from the 
receipt of funds. Bech and Garratt (2003) carefully specify a 
game-theoretic environment in which they find that RTGS 
systems can be characterized by multiple equilibria, some of 
which can involve excessive delay. Roberds (1999) compares 
gross and net payments systems with systems offering an LSM. 
Examining the incentives banks have to engage in more 
risk-taking behavior in the different systems, Roberds finds 
that, under certain circumstances, the risk profiles of LSMs 
and net systems are identical. Mills and Nesmith (2008) also 
study the impact of incentives on banks’ payment patterns. 
McAndrews and Trundle (2001) and the Bank for International 
Settlements (2005) provide extensive descriptive material 
on LSMs. 
Willison (2005) examines the behavior of banks in an LSM, 
and this work is most similar to ours. He models agents as 
having an ordering of payment priority, which is similar in 
spirit to our assumption that some banks’ payments are time 
sensitive. Willison models the extension of credit from the 
central bank as an ex ante amount to be borrowed by banks, 
while in our study the credit is tapped ex post, depending on 
a bank’s per-period balance. Our model extends Willison’s 
analysis in two dimensions that prove to be important: We 
consider a wider array of LSMs and, crucially, we allow for 
liquidity shocks, which we define as shocks to the level of 
a bank’s balances on account.
Our study proceeds as follows. In the next section, we 
describe the environment in place when banks decide on their 
payment submission strategies. In subsequent sections, we 
consider various scenarios, including banks’ behavior in an 
RTGS system, a balance-reactive LSM, and a receipt-reactive 
LSM.
2. The Environment
This section describes the economic environment in which 
banks operate. It specifies the economic agents, which we refer 
to as banks; the banks’ objectives; and other factors that 
influence banks’ decisions. We study a simple payments 
system. While some features of our model are unrealistic 
because of their simplicity, we believe that the model captures 
essential economic frictions that affect banks’ behavior in the 
payments system. The simplicity of the model allows us to 
obtain explicit results and to provide transparent intuition 
for these results.4 
In our model, the essential features of an LSM are as follows. 
Payment orders are put in a queue, and the release of a payment 
order from the queue will occur when some conditions have 
been satisfied. Here, the conditions are that a bank has 
sufficient funds and that an offsetting payment has been 
received. While actual LSMs can be considerably more 
complicated, they all share those basic, essential features. By 
capturing the essential features shared by LSMs, our model can 
describe the basic economic mechanisms associated with these 
systems in a tractable way.
To incorporate additional features of queues, we would 
require a more complicated model that may be difficult to solve 
explicitly. Those additional features could include: 1) limits on 
the amount of central bank balances that can be committed to 
a particular bank or set of banks, 2) a time before or after which 
a payment should be sent, and 3) different payment priorities 
that can change the ordering of payments submitted to the 
queue away from first in, first out. Also, queues may or may not 
be transparent. If a queue is transparent, banks can see pending 
payments in their favor.5 In addition to the tractability issue, 
it is not clear that adding these features would modify our key 
insights into the potential benefits of the LSM’s essential 
feature: to allow conditionality in the settlement of some 
payments.
4 Our analysis summarizes our more technical paper (Martin and 
McAndrews 2008). 
5 In our model, queues are opaque—that is, banks cannot see particular 
payments in other banks’ queues. However, banks are forward looking and, in 
equilibrium, they will expect banks of different types to have (or have not) 
submitted some payments to the LSM, and these expectations will be fulfilled.
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Each day, the payments system operates during two periods: 
the morning and the afternoon. A large number of banks are 
involved, and each bank must send payments to other banks 
and will receive payments from other banks. For simplicity, 
all payments are of the same size. 
We assume that banks are risk neutral. Our definition of risk 
neutrality is that a bank would be willing to pay up to 50 cents 
for the opportunity to participate in a lottery that promises one 
dollar with probability 1/2 and nothing with probability 1/2. 
We believe that our results would extend to more complicated 
economies in which there are many periods and payments of 
different sizes. Banks have rational expectations about the 
probability of receiving a morning payment. In other words, 
banks are able to calculate the correct probability of receiving 
a payment in the morning. 
Banks must choose whether to send their payments to 
another bank in the morning or in the afternoon. Three factors 
influence this decision. First, banks face a cost if they must 
borrow funds at the central bank. Second, some banks must 
make time-sensitive payments. Third, banks may receive a 
positive liquidity shock, a negative liquidity shock, or no shock. 
Each factor is explained in more detail below.
Banks face a cost if they must borrow funds from the central 
bank. All banks start the day with zero reserves at the central 
bank and, because of the symmetry assumed by the model, end 
the day with zero reserves as well. Banks are not allowed to hold 
negative reserves at the end of the morning period, but they can 
borrow reserves from the central bank at a cost.6 For example, 
a bank that sends a payment but does not receive a payment in 
the morning period would have to borrow reserves. The cost of 
borrowing can represent either an explicit fee imposed by the 
central bank, as in the United States, or the implicit cost of 
collateral, as in many countries where central bank balances are 
6 We assume that excess reserves have zero return. In our model, banks cannot 
trade with one another the funds needed to make payments. This assumption 
is a common one in the literature and reflects the empirical observation that 
markets for intraday funds are either nonexistent or operate only in 
extraordinary circumstances. 
available for free but only against collateral. Evidence provided 
by the Bank for International Settlements (2005) suggests that 
the cost of central bank balances can influence banks’ payment 
behavior.
Some banks must make time-sensitive payments. If a time-
sensitive payment is not settled until the afternoon, the sending 
bank incurs a delay cost. This cost could arise because delay 
creates a bad reputation for the bank in the eyes of its 
customers or counterparties. The behavior of banks suggests 
that they perceive some payments as being more time sensitive 
than others. For example, payments made to close a real estate 
transaction may be more time sensitive than payments for 
previous deliveries of supplies to a manufacturer.7 However, 
delaying non-time-critical payments until the afternoon is 
costless. 
Banks may receive a positive liquidity shock, a negative 
liquidity shock, or no liquidity shock. The liquidity shock is 
modeled by assuming that each bank must send a second 
payment to (and will receive a payment from) a settlement 
institution. For the purpose of this article, U.S. settlement 
institutions are represented jointly by CLS Bank, CHIPS, 
and DTC.8 The settlement institution is intended to capture 
other payment or settlement systems whose pay-ins and 
payouts are made using the central bank’s payments system. 
This rearrangement of balances, which we refer to as a shock, 
introduces another source of heterogeneity between banks 
and leads to a more diverse set of strategic interactions. 
In the model, banks find out when they must send a 
payment to the settlement institutions and when they will 
receive an offsetting payment from the settlement institutions 
before they decide whether to send their payment to other 
banks. We assume that payments to settlement systems cannot 
be delayed. We say that a bank that receives a payment from the 
settlement institutions in the morning and does not have to 
make an offsetting payment until the afternoon has received 
a positive liquidity shock, as its account balances are boosted 
throughout the day prior to its late offsetting payment. 
Conversely, a bank that receives a payment from the settlement 
institutions in the afternoon but must make a payment in the 
7 Armantier, Arnold, and McAndrews (2008) find that Fedwire payments tend 
to settle earlier in the day on days with higher values of customer payments. 
This behavior could reflect higher costs of delay for customer payments relative 
to interbank payments.
8 CLS Bank is a payment-versus-payment settlement system that settles foreign 
exchange transactions in fifteen currencies. CLS Bank is operated by CLS Bank 
International, a bank-owned Edge Act corporation incorporated in the United 
States. CHIPS (the Clearing House Interbank Payments System) is a private, 
large-value U.S. dollar payments system owned and operated by the Clearing 
House Payments Company. DTC (the Depository Trust Company) is a 
securities settlement system that settles the majority of U.S. corporate securities 
and commercial paper. DTC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Depository Trust 
and Clearing Corporation.
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Banks Using Large-Value Payments Systems
Note: The key applies to Charts 1-10. It describes six types of banks: 
those sending time-sensitive payments that experience a positive liquidity 
shock, no liquidity shock, or a negative liquidity shock; and those sending 
non-time-sensitive payments that experience a positive liquidity shock, 
no liquidity shock, or a negative liquidity shock.
morning receives a negative shock, as its balances are depleted 
early. When the payment from the settlement institutions is 
received in the same period in which the bank’s outgoing 
payment to the settlement institutions must be sent, the bank 
experiences no liquidity shock, as the offsetting payments have 
a neutral effect on its balances. 
We assume that payments sent among banks are larger than 
payments sent to and received from settlement institutions. 
This implies that while banks may face large liquidity shocks, 
these shocks are relatively small compared with the banks’ 
expected payment activity. In addition, payments made 
through settlement institutions occur either at the very 
beginning or very end of the business day. Thus, a bank that 
begins its business day with a negative liquidity shock, then 
receives a payment from another bank in the morning, and 
then delays sending a payment to another bank will have a 
positive balance at the end of the morning period. In contrast, 
a bank that receives a positive liquidity shock at the start of the 
business day, then proceeds to send a payment to another bank 
in the morning, and then does not receive a payment from 
another bank during the morning period will end the morning 
with a negative balance. The latter bank must borrow from the 
central bank, incurring a borrowing cost in the process.
With all those factors explained, we can now trace out the 
intuition of the model. By itself, the cost of borrowing gives 
banks an incentive to send payments at the same time as other 
banks (either in the morning or in the afternoon). For example, 
absent liquidity shocks and delay costs, banks would be willing 
to send their payments in the morning (or afternoon) if they 
knew that all other banks would send theirs in the morning 
(or afternoon). That way, they would never have to borrow 
from the central bank. However, the cost of delay provides 
an incentive for banks to make payments early. For example, 
if the cost of delay is sufficiently high, a bank will prefer to send 
a time-critical payment early even if all other banks delay their 
payments. This will happen if the cost of delay is greater than 
the cost of borrowing. A cost of borrowing and a high cost of 
delay will therefore result in banks preferring to send payments 
all at the same time in the morning. Introducing the liquidity 
shock, together with the borrowing cost, provides an incentive 
for banks to delay payments. For example, a bank that 
experiences a negative liquidity shock and that must make a 
non-time-critical payment prefers to send it in the afternoon 
even if all other banks pay early. Indeed, in that case, the bank 
incurs no cost if it delays its payment, but it receives the benefit 
of not having to borrow from the central bank. 
In summary, each bank can have one of six possible profiles: 
It may or may not have to make a time-sensitive payment, and 
may experience a positive, negative, or no liquidity shock. 
Exhibit 1 displays the six profiles in the form of a color key that 
will describe the equilibria of our economy. We assign the color 
light blue to banks that receive a positive liquidity shock, gray 
to banks that receive no liquidity shock, and dark blue to banks 
that receive a negative liquidity shock. A black border indicates 
banks that must make time-sensitive payments, while a white 
border indicates banks that make non-time-sensitive 
payments.
The remainder of this article examines different settlement 
systems for the payments system described above. We consider 
real-time gross settlement alone and an RTGS system 
supplemented by two types of liquidity-saving mechanisms. 
In each case, we describe the timing of payments predicted by 
the model in equilibrium. In equilibrium, every bank chooses 
a submission time for its direct payments that minimizes its 
delay and borrowing costs given the payment submission 
strategies of all other banks in the payments system. We also 
compare the desirability of different settlement systems 
according to our model.
Each bank can have one of six possible 
profiles: It may or may not have to make 
a time-sensitive payment, and it may 
experience a positive, negative, or no 
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Banks find out when payments 
are sent to and received from 
settlement institutions (SIs) 
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3. Real-Time Gross Settlement
This section studies our model economy in terms of a real-time 
gross settlement system. With RTGS, payments are settled on 
an individual basis at the time they are sent. We assume that 
banks have sufficient borrowing capacity at the central bank to 
make payments, even if they do not receive a prior payment 
and/or have experienced a negative liquidity shock. Banks have 
the choice of sending payments in the morning or delaying 
them until the afternoon. They compare the expected cost 
of each option and choose the least expensive timing strategy. 
As shown in Exhibit 2, there is a pattern to how events unfold 
during the day. First, banks learn if they must send a time-
critical payment and if they have a positive, negative, or no 
liquidity shock. Next, early payments to settlement institutions 
are made. Afterward, banks decide whether to send their direct 
payments in the morning period or to delay sending them until 
the afternoon period. At the end of the morning period, banks 
incur a delay cost if they have delayed a time-sensitive payment 
or a borrowing cost if they must borrow from the central bank. 
In the afternoon, delayed payments to other banks are made, 
as are late payments to settlement institutions. 
Liquidity shocks force some banks to start the day with 
negative balances. If those banks do not have time-sensitive 
payments to make, then they can be counted on to delay their 
direct payments, since otherwise even the receipt of an 
offsetting payment would mean that they must borrow. So 
banks with negative liquidity shocks and non-time-sensitive 
payments will surely delay their payments until the afternoon 
period. Following domino-type logic, banks—even those that 
enjoyed a positive liquidity shock—will delay all other non-
time-sensitive payments until the afternoon, as they cannot 
count on offsetting payments during the morning period. 
In sum, in a world with liquidity shocks, we expect that all 
non-time-sensitive payments will always be delayed. 
We present the equilibria associated with RTGS in Charts 1-4. 
The dark gray bars indicate payments sent to settlement 
institutions. These payments are made either early in the 
morning or late in the afternoon. Payments to other banks are 
indicated in colors that correspond to a specific type of sender 
as described in Exhibit 1. Payments sent by banks that have 
experienced a negative liquidity shock are indicated in dark 
blue, those sent by banks that have received no liquidity shock 
are in gray, and those sent by banks that have experienced 
a positive liquidity shock are in light blue. A dark border 
corresponds to time-sensitive payments while a white border 
corresponds to non-time-sensitive payments. Given this color 
scheme, the behavior of each of the six types of banks can be 
seen within the bar, indicating whether a bank of a certain type 
sent its payments in the morning or the afternoon. 
Charts 1-4 show how the pattern of payments changes as the 
cost of delay decreases. In Chart 1, the cost of delay is high, so 
all time-sensitive payments are sent early. If the cost of delay 
decreases a little (Chart 2), banks that have experienced a 
negative liquidity shock will choose to delay their time-
sensitive payments. These banks have the highest expected cost 
of borrowing from the central bank, so if the cost of delay is not 
too high, banks will aim to reduce their need to borrow from 
the central bank by delaying payments. If the cost of delay 
decreases still further (Chart 3), only banks that have 
experienced a positive liquidity shock will send their time-
critical payments early. Finally, if the cost of delay is sufficiently 
low (Chart 4), all banks will delay payments regardless of their 
liquidity profiles.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2008 31
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The six types of banks/colors are described in Exhibit 1. 
LSM is liquidity-saving mechanism. 
 





















Real-Time Gross Settlement with High Costs 
of Delay
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The six types of banks/colors are described in Exhibit 1. 
LSM is liquidity-saving mechanism.  
 





















Real-Time Gross Settlement with Medium 
Costs of Delay
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The six types of banks/colors are described in Exhibit 1. 
LSM is liquidity-saving mechanism. 
 























Real-Time Gross Settlement with Lower Costs 
of Delay
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The six types of banks/colors are described in Exhibit 1. 
LSM is liquidity-saving mechanism.  
 
























Real-Time Gross Settlement with Lowest Costs 
of Delay
In general, multiple equilibria can exist. Each equilibrium 
described in Charts 1-4 may arise for the same set of 
parameters. There can be multiple equilibria because a bank’s 
incentives to pay early depend on the behavior of other banks.9
9 By multiple equilibria, we mean that, for the same set of parameters of the 
model, different sets of beliefs are consistent with an equilibrium. 
If all time-sensitive payments are sent early, then the 
probability of receiving a payment in the morning is high, 
implying that the probability of having to borrow from the 
central bank is low. If the expected cost of borrowing from the 
central bank is low, banks have a strong incentive to make their 
time-sensitive payments early to avoid the cost of delay. 32 An Economic Analysis of Liquidity-Saving Mechanisms
Conversely, if all time-sensitive payments are delayed, then the 
probability of receiving a payment in the morning is low (in 
this case, zero). It follows that banks will have to borrow from 
the central bank if they make payments early. With a high 
expected cost of borrowing, agents have only weak incentives 
to send payments early, even if this would allow them to avoid 
the delay cost. 
We can compare the welfare associated with different 
equilibria. Our measure of welfare is the expected utility of 
the average of the six possible types of banks. To measure this 
average payoff, we consider what would happen if all banks 
could meet before the beginning of the day. Before determining 
their respective liquidity shocks and whether they have to make 
a time-sensitive payment, all banks are identical and thus have 
the same preferences for payment patterns. 
When several equilibria coexist, welfare is highest in the 
equilibrium in which the greatest number of payments is sent 
in the early period.10 Prior to knowing its particular 
situation—that is, whether it has a positive or negative balance 
in the morning and whether it has a time-sensitive payment—
the average bank would prefer to make its payments at the same 
time as all other banks. This simultaneous payment pattern 
reduces banks’ expected borrowing needs. Given the level of 
coordination, the average bank would prefer to make 
simultaneous payments in the morning, thereby reducing delay 
costs. For all equilibria, our measure of welfare decreases with 
the cost of delay and with the cost of borrowing. 
We can illustrate the role liquidity shocks play in our 
analysis by looking at how equilibrium outcomes change when 
these shocks are suppressed. This would correspond to the case 
where all banks make their pay-ins to the settlement 
institutions and receive their payouts from the settlement 
institutions early. Absent liquidity shocks, all banks start the 
morning period with zero balances and the only difference 
among them is whether or not their payments are time 
sensitive. Three types of equilibria are possible: 1) all payments 
10 Note that the pattern of payments such that all payments, including time-
sensitive ones, are made early may not provide maximum welfare. This does 
not contradict the result stated above, as this pattern of payments is not an 
equilibrium. 
are sent early, 2) only time-sensitive payments are sent early, 
or 3) all payments are delayed. 
Consider the equilibrium in which all payments are sent in 
the morning period. This is an equilibrium, regardless of the 
magnitude of borrowing and delay costs, because if all other 
banks are sending their payments in the morning, an individual 
bank is at least as well off sending its payments in the morning 
as delaying them until the afternoon. If the bank has a time-
sensitive payment, the bank is strictly better off sending it in the 
morning; if the bank does not, it is equally well off sending its 
payments in the morning to coincide with its receipts. This type 
of equilibrium does not exist when some banks have 
experienced a negative liquidity shock.
The costs of delay and borrowing matter for the other two 
equilibria. If the cost of delaying time-sensitive payments is 
low, if the borrowing cost is high, and if banks without a time-
sensitive payment plan to pay in the afternoon, then banks that 
must make a time-sensitive payment would prefer to delay it. 
Indeed, banks want to avoid high borrowing costs, even if they 
must incur relatively low delay costs. Likewise, if the cost of 
delay is high relative to the cost of borrowing, then banks with 
time-sensitive payments would prefer to make them early, even 
if banks without time-sensitive payments choose to delay 
making theirs. 
4. Balance-Reactive Liquidity-Saving 
Mechanism
This section studies our model economy under a particular 
design of a liquidity-saving mechanism. An LSM can be 
thought of as a queue, into which banks enter their payments 
as an alternative to sending or delaying payments outright. 
A queued payment is released in the morning if the bank that 
queued the payment receives an offsetting payment or if a 
group of queued payments offset multilaterally. Otherwise, 
the payment is released from the queue in the afternoon. 
The probability of a payment being released from the queue 
depends on the underlying pattern of payments. Exhibits 3 and 4 
illustrate two cases. In the exhibits, the Xs denote banks and the 
arrows denote a payment that must be made from one bank to 
another. In Exhibit 3, all payments form a unique cycle that 
links all banks. Here, payments in the queue cannot offset 
multilaterally unless all payments are queued. In Exhibit 4, 
payments form cycles of length 2 that link banks in pairs. This 
pattern of payments maximizes the probability that payments 
in the queue offset bilaterally. The case of a unique cycle, 
illustrated in Exhibit 3, is particularly interesting because it 
allows us to disentangle two different roles played by LSMs. 
One is that the LSM allows agents to condition the release of 
Banks have the choice of sending 
payments in the morning or delaying them 
until the afternoon. They compare the 
expected cost of each option and choose 
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a payment on the receipt of an offsetting payment. A different, 
though complementary, role is that an LSM can permit 
bilateral or multilateral netting. In the case of a unique cycle, 
however, no netting occurs unless all payments are in the 
queue. Here we can study, in isolation, the role of the LSM in 
allowing banks to make payments conditional on the receipt 
of offsetting payments.
Exhibit 5 shows the timing of payments in a system in which 
banks are able to submit payments to the LSM. The difference 
between this and pure RTGS is that now banks have the option 
of queuing their payments. In other words, a bank can 
condition its sending of a queued payment on the receipt of an 
offsetting payment, in addition to sending or delaying the 
payments outright. The decision to queue a payment is made 
after the bank’s liquidity shock is known, allowing the bank to 
take into account the shock’s effect on the level of the balance 
before deciding whether to queue a payment. Thus, we call this 
a balance-reactive LSM. Later, we will consider an LSM in 
which the release of a payment from the queue does not depend 
on a liquidity shock.
Charts 5-8 illustrate the equilibria arising with a balance-
reactive LSM. The visual coding in these charts is the same as in 
Charts 1-4. That is, payments from banks that experience a 
positive liquidity shock are indicated in light blue, those from 
banks that experience no liquidity shock are in gray, and those 
from banks that experience a negative liquidity shock are in 
dark blue. A black border indicates time-sensitive payments 
while a white border indicates payments that are not time 
sensitive. In addition, dark shading indicates payments entered 
in the queue, which we emphasize by adding a queue-
submission stage. Payments released from the queue have a 
light shading, while payments sent outright or delayed have no 34 An Economic Analysis of Liquidity-Saving Mechanisms
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The six types of banks/colors are described in Exhibit 1. Dashed 
borders indicate payments submitted to the queue. Shading indicates 
payments released from the queue. An absence of shading indicates 
payments either sent outright or delayed (not queued).
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Notes: The six types of banks/colors are described in Exhibit 1. Dashed 
borders indicate payments submitted to the queue. Shading indicates 
payments released from the queue. An absence of shading indicates 
payments either sent outright or delayed (not queued).
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shading. Some payments from the queue will be released in the 
afternoon unless all payments are queued. 
In Chart 5, all payments are queued. This happens if both 
the cost of delay and the liquidity shocks are not too high. In 
this case, all payments are released in the morning and no delay 
cost is incurred. Banks with a negative liquidity shock, 
however, must borrow from the central bank. 
If the cost of delay is higher and the liquidity shocks remain 
moderate, the equilibrium depicted in Chart 6 can occur. In 
this equilibrium, banks that experience positive liquidity 
shocks choose to make time-sensitive payments outright 
during the early period. Banks that experience negative 
liquidity shocks delay non-time-sensitive payments. All other 
payments—time-sensitive payments from banks that 
experience negative or zero liquidity shocks and non-time-
sensitive payments from banks that experience positive or zero 
liquidity shocks—are queued. Some payments are released 
from the queue in the morning and some are released in the 
afternoon. 
The intuition is as follows. Because the cost of delay is 
sufficiently high, banks that have experienced a positive 
liquidity shock prefer to insure themselves against the risk of 
having to suffer the cost of delay. For this reason, they send 
payments outright. Banks that receive a negative liquidity 
shock prefer to delay non-time-sensitive payments. By delaying 
their own outgoing payments, these banks avoid the need to 
borrow from the central bank if they receive a payment from 
another bank in the morning. Note that for parameters in 
which the equilibria in Charts 5 and 6 coexist, the latter 
equilibrium is not robust. 
If the cost of delay is higher still, the equilibrium presented 
in Chart 7 can occur. In this equilibrium, all banks that must 
make time-sensitive payments choose to send them outright. 
Banks that experience a negative liquidity shock delay non-
time-sensitive payments, while those that experience a positive 
or no liquidity shock queue non-time-sensitive payments. 
If the cost of delay is neither very high nor very low and the 
liquidity shocks are large, then the equilibrium in Chart 8 will 
occur. Because the liquidity shock is so large, banks that receive 
a negative liquidity shock at the beginning of the day delay both 
time-sensitive and non-time-sensitive payments. Only banks 
that receive a positive liquidity shock at the beginning of the 
day choose to send time-sensitive payments early; all other 
payments are queued.
The same types of equilibria exist in a unique cycle and in 
cycles of length 2. However, the parameters under which these 
equilibria exist in each case can be different. With cycles of 
length 2, there can be multiple equilibria, as is true with pure 
RTGS. In contrast, with a unique cycle, only one equilibrium 
exists for any configuration of parameters. 
To understand this difference, note that an LSM allows 
banks to condition the release of a payment on other banks’ FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2008 35
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The six types of banks/colors are described in Exhibit 1. Dashed 
borders indicate payments submitted to the queue. Shading indicates 
payments released from the queue. An absence of shading indicates 
payments either sent outright or delayed (not queued).
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Notes: The six types of banks/colors are described in Exhibit 1. Dashed 
borders indicate payments submitted to the queue. Shading indicates 
payments released from the queue. An absence of shading indicates 
payments either sent outright or delayed (not queued).
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actions, which reduces strategic interaction between banks. 
In RTGS, by contrast, the level of strategic interaction is high: 
Whether or not a bank chooses to send a payment during the 
early period depends in large part on that bank’s beliefs about 
the strategy other banks have adopted for the timing of their 
payments. With the LSM, the bank need not concern itself with 
such complicated reasoning because it can simply submit a 
payment to settle automatically if an offsetting payment is 
received, decoupling the bank’s decision to submit the 
payment to the LSM from the bank’s beliefs about the plans 
of other banks.
Whenever multilateral netting is expected to occur in the 
queue, a new set of strategic interactions emerges. A bank’s 
incentives to submit payments to the queue depend on the 
bank’s belief about what other banks will do. If many other 
banks submit their payments to the queue, then more netting 
will occur and the incentive to queue will be high. In contrast, 
if only a few other banks submit their payments to the queue, 
less netting will occur and the incentive to queue will be low. 
As a result, the possibility of multilateral netting of queued 
payments reintroduces strategic interaction into banks’ 
submission behavior, leading to multiple equilibria. In 
contrast, since there is no netting in a unique cycle, multiple 
equilibria do not occur.
We can compare the welfare of banks if settlement occurs 
according to RTGS or to a balance-reactive LSM. Welfare is 
higher with the balance-reactive LSM if the liquidity shocks 
are small, if the cost of delay is either sufficiently high or 
sufficiently low, and if the probability of a liquidity shock 
occurring is large compared with the fraction of time-sensitive 
payments. In one specific case, a balance-reactive LSM can lead 
to a loss of some beneficial coordination and result in lower 
welfare.
When liquidity shocks are small, banks incur a large 
borrowing cost only if they send a payment early and do not 
receive an offsetting payment. An LSM increases welfare 
because it allows banks to insure themselves against this risk 
because the bank’s payment is released from the queue only 
when an offsetting payment is received. Also, because banks 
can queue their payments rather than delay them outright, 
more payments are released in the morning and fewer banks 
incur a delay cost.
If the cost of delay is sufficiently high, banks send all time-
sensitive payments early, regardless of the settlement 
mechanism. However, banks that do not receive a negative 
liquidity shock queue their payments when an LSM is available, 
rather than delay them as they would in RTGS. Hence, more 
payments are released early and the expected cost of borrowing 
is reduced for banks that send payments outright. If the cost of 
delay is sufficiently low, all banks will find it beneficial to queue 
payments when an LSM is available so that all payments are 
released early.36 An Economic Analysis of Liquidity-Saving Mechanisms
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If the fraction of time-sensitive payments is relatively small, 
then the benefit of queuing non-time-sensitive payments 
under a balance-reactive LSM—rather than delaying them, 
which would occur in RTGS—is large. Here too a balance-
reactive LSM provides higher welfare than would RTGS. 
If none of these conditions is satisfied, an instance may arise 
in which RTGS provides higher welfare than does a balance-
reactive LSM. There exists a set of parameters for which the 
equilibrium described in Chart 2 is the unique RTGS 
equilibrium. In this equilibrium, banks that do not receive a 
liquidity shock send a time-critical payment early. For this set 
of parameters, the best LSM equilibrium is described in Chart 8. 
In this equilibrium, banks that do not receive a liquidity shock 
prefer to queue a time-critical payment, rather than send it 
early, because it provides them with some insurance against the 
risk of having to borrow from the central bank. However, this 
action lowers the number of payments that are released in the 
morning and reduces welfare. This example shows that RTGS 
can create beneficial coordination among banks to send some 
payments early. In this case, the presence of a queue unravels 
that coordination. 
Again, we can illustrate the role of liquidity shocks by 
considering what happens when they are suppressed. Absent 
liquidity shocks, all payments are released early. This could 
happen if all the payments are queued, if they are all sent in the 
morning outright, or if some are queued and the others are sent 
in the morning outright.
5. Receipt-Reactive Liquidity-Saving 
Mechanism
We now consider a different LSM design. Previously, we 
assumed that banks could make their decision to queue a 
payment conditional on their liquidity shock or, equivalently, 
on their balance. Here we assume that banks do not know their 
liquidity shock when they decide either to queue payments or 
to pay in the morning period. We also assume that the decision 
to queue is irrevocable. Since banks can condition their 
behavior only on the receipt of other payments, but not on 
their balance, we call this a receipt-reactive LSM.11
This case illustrates another possible feature of an LSM that 
can affect bank behavior. In the receipt-reactive LSM, banks are 
given a tool that enables them to commit to making a payment 
at a particular time. This ability is valuable to banks. The new 
timing of events is shown in Exhibit 6. 
11 Receipt-reactive LSMs were first discussed and studied in Johnson, 
McAndrews, and Soramäki (2004).
We can illustrate the role of liquidity 
shocks by considering what happens 
when they are suppressed. Absent 
liquidity shocks, all payments are 
released early.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2008 37
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The six types of banks/colors are described in Exhibit 1. Dashed 
borders indicate payments submitted to the queue. Shading indicates 
payments released from the queue. An absence of shading indicates 
payments either sent outright or delayed (not queued).
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Note: The six types of banks/colors are described in Exhibit 1. 
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Charts 9 and 10 illustrate the two types of equilibria that can 
occur with a receipt-reactive LSM. In the equilibrium described 
in Chart 9, all payments are queued and hence released in the 
morning. Note that early payments to settlement institutions, 
which represent the liquidity shock, occur after payments have 
been sent to the queue. In the equilibrium described in Chart 10, 
all time-sensitive payments are made early and non-time-
sensitive payments are delayed. 
We can now compare welfare among RTGS, a balance-
reactive LSM, and a receipt-reactive LSM. In our model, 
a receipt-reactive LSM always provides welfare at least as high 
as RTGS. This outcome stands in contrast to a balance-reactive 
LSM, which provides lower welfare than RTGS under the 
circumstances outlined above. A receipt-reactive LSM may or 
may not provide higher welfare than a balance-reactive LSM 
does. If the cost of delay is sufficiently large, for example, a 
balance-reactive LSM will provide higher welfare. A balance-
reactive LSM will also provide higher welfare when the cost 
of delay and the probability of a liquidity shock are small.
 6.C o n c l u s i o n
This article studies a model in which banks settle daily 
payments while seeking to minimize the costs associated with 
payment delays and intraday borrowing. The novel feature of 
our model is that banks are subject to two types of shocks. First, 
banks are randomly assigned to have either time-critical 
payments, whose late-period settlement imposes a cost on the 
bank, or non-time-critical payments. Second, banks are subject 
to liquidity shocks at the start of the day because of the nature 
of settlement institutions’ operations. Together, these two 
types of shocks yield a rich array of strategic situations. The 
important parameters in our model are the cost of delay, the 
cost of borrowing intraday funds from the central bank, the 
relative size of the payments made to the settlement system 
with respect to bank-to-bank payments, and the proportion 
of time-critical payments.
To model the working of a balance-reactive liquidity-saving 
mechanism, we study two extreme cases. In the first, there is no 
possibility of netting any strict subset of payments. In the 
second, payments offset each other bilaterally. These two 
models provide different motives for using the LSM. In the first 
case, banks do not assign payments to the LSM queue in the 
hope of offsetting them within the queue, but rather to have 
them settle only conditional on receiving another payment. 
In the second, banks can also anticipate that, some of the time, 
their queued LSM payments will be offset and will settle inside 
the queue.38 An Economic Analysis of Liquidity-Saving Mechanisms
In most cases, the presence of a balance-reactive LSM 
increases welfare compared with a real-time gross settlement 
system alone, but, perhaps surprisingly, welfare may also be 
reduced. A balance-reactive LSM provides higher welfare if the 
cost of delay is high enough or low enough, and if the size of the 
outside settlement system and the proportion of time-critical 
payments are relatively low. When this is not true, RTGS can 
achieve higher welfare. The intuition is that RTGS creates some 
beneficial coordination of payments that can be undone by the 
presence of a queue. In our example, some banks that send 
payments early under the unique RTGS equilibrium choose to 
put the payments in the queue when they are available. The 
resulting reduction in the number of payments settled early 
leads to lower welfare. 
With a receipt-reactive LSM, the level of welfare achieved is 
always at least as high as the level achieved in RTGS alone. Here 
the intuition is simpler. As banks cannot condition the sending 
of payments on balances, they either submit all their payments 
to the queue or they simply make all the time-critical payments 
in the early period.
In comparing balance-reactive and receipt-reactive LSMs, 
we find that when delay costs are high and the payments to 
settlement systems are not too large, the balance-reactive LSM 
yields a better outcome than its receipt-reactive counterpart. As 
a result, while our results point to LSMs being at least weakly 
preferred to RTGS for all parameter configurations, the 
practical choice can present more of a dilemma to the operator 
of the large-value payments system. The dilemma is that our 
results show that the LSM design matters. If the wrong LSM is 
implemented, it can yield either lower welfare than RTGS or 
lower welfare than a competing LSM design. The challenge for 
a payments system operator is to know the sizes of the four 
parameters of interest. Here we have considered basic design 
elements in choosing the LSMs to model; more complex 
designs would introduce other behavioral considerations that 
are beyond the scope of this article.
Future research in this area would thus benefit from 
focusing on the empirical magnitudes of the parameters of 
interest. The cost of delaying payments and the proportion of 
payments that are time critical are especially important to 
measure and difficult to observe. Research employing 
alternative distributions of these parameters will be important, 
as will be the extension of the current model to include several 
periods.References
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